The stem cell debate
President Bush considered the answers to two questions as he made his decision on funding embryonic stem cell research. “First, are these frozen embryos human life, and therefore, something precious to be protected?” And second, if they’re going to be destroyed anyway shouldn’t they be used for a greater good, for research that has the potential to save and improve other lives?” In answering these questions the President believes that “human life is a sacred gift from our creator” and should be protected. Human embryos are destroyed when the stem cells are removed and therefore he was not willing to promote embryonic stem cell research by providing federal funding. His decision was instead to provide funding for research using the 60 stem cell lines that were already in use at that time. He refused to provide federal funding for any further embryonic stem cell research since it would involve the “further destruction of human embryos that have at least the potential for life.”
Embryonic stem cells are derived from the inner cell mass of a blastocyst, prior to implantation in the uterine wall. Embryonic stem cells have the ability to differentiate into all derivatives of the three embryonic germ layers, and are termed pluripotent. Due to their plasticity and self-renewal qualities, they are considered astounding vehicles for regenerative medicine and tissue replacement.[1] Unrestricted private-sector research continues in the United States, yet federal funding has been withheld by the Dickey-Wicker amendment and the decisions of the Bush administration.[2]
At the crux of the ethical debate concerning embryonic stem cell research is the fundamental question related to the moral status of the embryo. When and if the zygote or subsequent embryo elicits a reference to personhood is of vital importance when deconstructing the embryonic stem cell issue; the onset of personhood determines the moral or immoral nature of destroying these cells for the sake of biotechnology. President Bush was confronted with this very question in 2001, and was challenged further when the US House of Representatives passed a bill in 2006 allowing embryonic stem cell research using unwanted, donated frozen embryos from fertility clinics. An identical bill was vetoed by President Bush the previous year, and his justification remained the same. According to his White House spokesman Tony Snow, “The simple answer is he thinks murder’s wrong”. [3]
While there is no simple answer for anything pertaining to this ethical debate, I believe that the issue of personhood needs to be addressed. President Bush has contested federal funding for embryonic research based on the premise that human life is sacred and thus should be protected.[4] Such funding should be implemented based on status and complicity, for which I assert that embryos do not constitute “human life,” and therefore should not be granted the level of protection suggested by Robert Song. This paper will begin by confronting Song in terms of personhood and afforded protection, and will discuss the issue of surplus IVF embryos. Additionally, an alternative to Song’s notion of Christian hospitality will be discussed and applied to the stem cell debate. My objective is to strengthen the case for federal funding on embryonic stem cell research in the United States.
Beginning at fertilization, Song believes that embryos should be granted the same protection given to those unambiguously regarded as persons, such as children or grown adults.[5] While he doesn’t insist that embryos are persons, he states that if there is doubt over the status of the embryo, protection should be afforded on the basis that “to be willing to kill what for all one knows is a person is tantamount to being willing to kill a person.”[6] Analogous to his proposition is the idea that performing an activity that we think has the potential to be morally wrong is equal to performing an activity that we know is morally wrong. Therefore it’s in our best interest not to participate in the activity because the doubt involved isn’t significant enough to differentiate the two activities and warrant the acceptability of the first action. While I understand his logic, this doesn’t fit within the framework of the stem cell debate because the doubt over the personhood of the embryo is greater than Song chooses to acknowledge. Terminating an embryo that could potentially be a person, at the zygotic stage and beyond, is not equal to killing a person. A fully developed human being has a central nervous system that yields cognitive functioning and sensory capacity.[7] Physiologically, an embryo possesses neither ability, nor any other feature which allows a developed human being to function independently. I think Song’s theory is more appropriate for a debate on abortion, when the fetus’ personhood is in question, and it shares some of the physiological characteristics that constitute a fully developed human being.
Padgett makes a compelling point when referencing “the argument from ignorance” regarding when the embryo becomes a human person.[8] He believes that the notion of, “since we don’t know, better to err on the side of caution,” is more appropriate with respect to the fetus versus the embryo.[9] He believes that within the “potential person” sub-debate is the assumption that a zygote may in fact be a person.[10] I identify with this assessment. Furthermore, I agree with Padgett and his emphasis on neural activity and his apprehension to label something a human person that doesn’t have a brain cell.[11] If we choose to agree that a person’s life is over based on the termination of brain function, we should likewise necessitate brain activity when we deem an embryo a living being. Some may refute the above arguments by suggesting that personhood is an all-or-nothing phenomenon that begins at conception. Likewise, physiological development is irrelevant as the embryo inherently possesses personhood status regardless of its’ biological composition. This idea is built on the assumption that there is something intrinsically unique about the embryo at the cellular level, and fails to validate the embryo’s personhood with scientific evidence. Based on biological fact, there is a clear distinction between an embryo and a human person. Therefore, personhood should only be entitled to the latter.
Embryos should be respected, but not to the degree suggested by Song.[12] If uncertainty exists over the status of the embryo, priority should be given to those whose status isn’t under contention: scientists and third party beneficiaries. Embryos should be granted a level of respect that deters cultivation purely to benefit third parties, but shouldn’t be given personhood status which prevents scientists from using leftover embryos for research and therapy.
In the United States, it’s estimated that fertility clinics have roughly 400,000 leftover frozen embryos.[13] Many, if not all, will be discarded. I have no objection to using these surplus embryos and assume a “nothing is lost” position which includes exempting conditions such as, (a) observing that existing embryos will be discarded anyway and (b) observing that as research material they could be indirectly life-saving.[14]
When I ponder degenerative disorders such as Parkinson disease, and their potential to be squelched by the introduction of embryonic stem cell therapy, it’s difficult to overlook the utilization of leftover embryos regardless of their status. If these embryos are to be discarded, the only moral option is to introduce them to research for the sake of those who are plagued by disease. Parkinsonism produces 40,000 new cases in the United States each year, and is one of several conditions that stand to benefit from federally funded stem cell research.[15] Why should anyone suffer from such a horrific, neurologically disabling disease when a potential cure is literally being thrown away? If the Bush administration continues to restrict using surplus embryos, they should likewise oppose in vitro fertilization which is the vehicle of left over embryos. Some might argue that surplus embryos are by-products of moral intentionality, and their destruction is never intended. Using surplus embryos to benefit third parties would sanction them as instruments, and would condone an immoral action. An extreme view, held by some Roman Catholics against the “Nothing is Lost” position, implicates a scientist as complicit in the crime of abortive murder if one elects to destroy surplus embryos in the process of research and therapy. [16] I would argue that regardless of the personhood of the embryo, using them as instruments to heal the sick in our community could never be immoral or murderous. Even if personhood is granted to the embryo, a sacrificial purpose would be greater than no purpose at all.
Song discusses the Christian virtue of hospitality and the importance of giving our time and love to the stranger.[17] He incorporates this virtue into the stem cell debate by suggesting it’s especially imperative in the case of an embryo, as they don’t normally produce feelings of compassion that are equal to what are felt toward a fetus.[18] I disagree with Song’s limited interpretation of Christian hospitality as it relates to this issue. The concept of giving our time and love to the stranger should be extended to third party recipients. I would argue that the very fact we don’t instinctively feel the level of compassion that we do for a fetus excuses us from directing the same level of Christian hospitality to an embryo. Virtue ought to be exercised with a degree of discernment, which involves deciphering through the issue as a whole and making a decision—especially in the Christian context—that benefits someone who’s status isn’t in contention, in this case, the third party beneficiary versus the embryo. Song’s idea of Christian hospitality is far too limited and should include beneficiaries of embryonic stem cell research: the diseased and disabled. The virtue of Christian hospitality should focus on the Parkinson patient in this debate, not the embryo.
My objections against President Bush’s decision concerning federal funding for embryonic research challenge the questions he addressed himself when consulting his advisors and scrutinizing the issue independently. Frozen embryos are not human life, and if their destruction is imminent, they should be used for research purposes. I agree with President Bush that human life is sacred and should be protected, but I don’t believe embryos fit the criteria for the level of personhood and guardianship he proposes. I passionately believe that as stewards of the earth, our commission requires us to prioritize where we direct our medical resources and who we choose to protect. Deciding to abstain from embryonic stem cell research may avoid destroying an entity that may eventually develop into human life, but pursuing such an endeavor has the capacity to heal the suffering that are among us right now.
[1] See pp 330-331 in Maternity and Women’s Health Care 8th ed. (Mosby, 2004)
[2] Domestic Policy Council, Advancing Stem Cell Science Without Destroying Human Life, April 2007, Pg. 5. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/stemcell)
[3] See pp. 112 in Janice Hopkins Tanne. “Democrats push for stem cell research in US”. BMJ, 2007. (www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/334/7585/112-a)
[4] (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html)
[5] See pg. 440 in Robert Song. “Stem Cell Research? No-For Protection of the Innocent.” Word and World 23 (2003): 440, 442.
[6] See Song, 440
[7] See Maternity and Women’s Health Care, 332
[8] See pg. 443 in Alan Padgett, “Stem Cell Research? Yes-Out of Love for the neighbor.” Word and World 23 (2003): 441, 443.
[9] See Padgett, 443
[10] See Padgett, 443
[11] See Padgett, 443
[12] See Song, 440
[13] See pp. 216 in Janice Hopkins Tanne, “Bush vetoes bill to expand stem cell research”. BMJ, 2006. (www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/333/7561/216-b)
[14] See pp. 188 in Ted Peters and Gaymon Bennet Jr., “Stem Cell Research and the Claim of the Other in the Human Subject.” Dialog 43, (2004): 184-204
[15] See pp. 414 in Understanding Pathophysiology 3rd edition. (Mosby, 2004)
[16] See Peters and Bennet Jr., 188
[17] See Song, 442
[18] See Song, 442
Embryonic stem cells are derived from the inner cell mass of a blastocyst, prior to implantation in the uterine wall. Embryonic stem cells have the ability to differentiate into all derivatives of the three embryonic germ layers, and are termed pluripotent. Due to their plasticity and self-renewal qualities, they are considered astounding vehicles for regenerative medicine and tissue replacement.[1] Unrestricted private-sector research continues in the United States, yet federal funding has been withheld by the Dickey-Wicker amendment and the decisions of the Bush administration.[2]
At the crux of the ethical debate concerning embryonic stem cell research is the fundamental question related to the moral status of the embryo. When and if the zygote or subsequent embryo elicits a reference to personhood is of vital importance when deconstructing the embryonic stem cell issue; the onset of personhood determines the moral or immoral nature of destroying these cells for the sake of biotechnology. President Bush was confronted with this very question in 2001, and was challenged further when the US House of Representatives passed a bill in 2006 allowing embryonic stem cell research using unwanted, donated frozen embryos from fertility clinics. An identical bill was vetoed by President Bush the previous year, and his justification remained the same. According to his White House spokesman Tony Snow, “The simple answer is he thinks murder’s wrong”. [3]
While there is no simple answer for anything pertaining to this ethical debate, I believe that the issue of personhood needs to be addressed. President Bush has contested federal funding for embryonic research based on the premise that human life is sacred and thus should be protected.[4] Such funding should be implemented based on status and complicity, for which I assert that embryos do not constitute “human life,” and therefore should not be granted the level of protection suggested by Robert Song. This paper will begin by confronting Song in terms of personhood and afforded protection, and will discuss the issue of surplus IVF embryos. Additionally, an alternative to Song’s notion of Christian hospitality will be discussed and applied to the stem cell debate. My objective is to strengthen the case for federal funding on embryonic stem cell research in the United States.
Beginning at fertilization, Song believes that embryos should be granted the same protection given to those unambiguously regarded as persons, such as children or grown adults.[5] While he doesn’t insist that embryos are persons, he states that if there is doubt over the status of the embryo, protection should be afforded on the basis that “to be willing to kill what for all one knows is a person is tantamount to being willing to kill a person.”[6] Analogous to his proposition is the idea that performing an activity that we think has the potential to be morally wrong is equal to performing an activity that we know is morally wrong. Therefore it’s in our best interest not to participate in the activity because the doubt involved isn’t significant enough to differentiate the two activities and warrant the acceptability of the first action. While I understand his logic, this doesn’t fit within the framework of the stem cell debate because the doubt over the personhood of the embryo is greater than Song chooses to acknowledge. Terminating an embryo that could potentially be a person, at the zygotic stage and beyond, is not equal to killing a person. A fully developed human being has a central nervous system that yields cognitive functioning and sensory capacity.[7] Physiologically, an embryo possesses neither ability, nor any other feature which allows a developed human being to function independently. I think Song’s theory is more appropriate for a debate on abortion, when the fetus’ personhood is in question, and it shares some of the physiological characteristics that constitute a fully developed human being.
Padgett makes a compelling point when referencing “the argument from ignorance” regarding when the embryo becomes a human person.[8] He believes that the notion of, “since we don’t know, better to err on the side of caution,” is more appropriate with respect to the fetus versus the embryo.[9] He believes that within the “potential person” sub-debate is the assumption that a zygote may in fact be a person.[10] I identify with this assessment. Furthermore, I agree with Padgett and his emphasis on neural activity and his apprehension to label something a human person that doesn’t have a brain cell.[11] If we choose to agree that a person’s life is over based on the termination of brain function, we should likewise necessitate brain activity when we deem an embryo a living being. Some may refute the above arguments by suggesting that personhood is an all-or-nothing phenomenon that begins at conception. Likewise, physiological development is irrelevant as the embryo inherently possesses personhood status regardless of its’ biological composition. This idea is built on the assumption that there is something intrinsically unique about the embryo at the cellular level, and fails to validate the embryo’s personhood with scientific evidence. Based on biological fact, there is a clear distinction between an embryo and a human person. Therefore, personhood should only be entitled to the latter.
Embryos should be respected, but not to the degree suggested by Song.[12] If uncertainty exists over the status of the embryo, priority should be given to those whose status isn’t under contention: scientists and third party beneficiaries. Embryos should be granted a level of respect that deters cultivation purely to benefit third parties, but shouldn’t be given personhood status which prevents scientists from using leftover embryos for research and therapy.
In the United States, it’s estimated that fertility clinics have roughly 400,000 leftover frozen embryos.[13] Many, if not all, will be discarded. I have no objection to using these surplus embryos and assume a “nothing is lost” position which includes exempting conditions such as, (a) observing that existing embryos will be discarded anyway and (b) observing that as research material they could be indirectly life-saving.[14]
When I ponder degenerative disorders such as Parkinson disease, and their potential to be squelched by the introduction of embryonic stem cell therapy, it’s difficult to overlook the utilization of leftover embryos regardless of their status. If these embryos are to be discarded, the only moral option is to introduce them to research for the sake of those who are plagued by disease. Parkinsonism produces 40,000 new cases in the United States each year, and is one of several conditions that stand to benefit from federally funded stem cell research.[15] Why should anyone suffer from such a horrific, neurologically disabling disease when a potential cure is literally being thrown away? If the Bush administration continues to restrict using surplus embryos, they should likewise oppose in vitro fertilization which is the vehicle of left over embryos. Some might argue that surplus embryos are by-products of moral intentionality, and their destruction is never intended. Using surplus embryos to benefit third parties would sanction them as instruments, and would condone an immoral action. An extreme view, held by some Roman Catholics against the “Nothing is Lost” position, implicates a scientist as complicit in the crime of abortive murder if one elects to destroy surplus embryos in the process of research and therapy. [16] I would argue that regardless of the personhood of the embryo, using them as instruments to heal the sick in our community could never be immoral or murderous. Even if personhood is granted to the embryo, a sacrificial purpose would be greater than no purpose at all.
Song discusses the Christian virtue of hospitality and the importance of giving our time and love to the stranger.[17] He incorporates this virtue into the stem cell debate by suggesting it’s especially imperative in the case of an embryo, as they don’t normally produce feelings of compassion that are equal to what are felt toward a fetus.[18] I disagree with Song’s limited interpretation of Christian hospitality as it relates to this issue. The concept of giving our time and love to the stranger should be extended to third party recipients. I would argue that the very fact we don’t instinctively feel the level of compassion that we do for a fetus excuses us from directing the same level of Christian hospitality to an embryo. Virtue ought to be exercised with a degree of discernment, which involves deciphering through the issue as a whole and making a decision—especially in the Christian context—that benefits someone who’s status isn’t in contention, in this case, the third party beneficiary versus the embryo. Song’s idea of Christian hospitality is far too limited and should include beneficiaries of embryonic stem cell research: the diseased and disabled. The virtue of Christian hospitality should focus on the Parkinson patient in this debate, not the embryo.
My objections against President Bush’s decision concerning federal funding for embryonic research challenge the questions he addressed himself when consulting his advisors and scrutinizing the issue independently. Frozen embryos are not human life, and if their destruction is imminent, they should be used for research purposes. I agree with President Bush that human life is sacred and should be protected, but I don’t believe embryos fit the criteria for the level of personhood and guardianship he proposes. I passionately believe that as stewards of the earth, our commission requires us to prioritize where we direct our medical resources and who we choose to protect. Deciding to abstain from embryonic stem cell research may avoid destroying an entity that may eventually develop into human life, but pursuing such an endeavor has the capacity to heal the suffering that are among us right now.
[1] See pp 330-331 in Maternity and Women’s Health Care 8th ed. (Mosby, 2004)
[2] Domestic Policy Council, Advancing Stem Cell Science Without Destroying Human Life, April 2007, Pg. 5. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/stemcell)
[3] See pp. 112 in Janice Hopkins Tanne. “Democrats push for stem cell research in US”. BMJ, 2007. (www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/334/7585/112-a)
[4] (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html)
[5] See pg. 440 in Robert Song. “Stem Cell Research? No-For Protection of the Innocent.” Word and World 23 (2003): 440, 442.
[6] See Song, 440
[7] See Maternity and Women’s Health Care, 332
[8] See pg. 443 in Alan Padgett, “Stem Cell Research? Yes-Out of Love for the neighbor.” Word and World 23 (2003): 441, 443.
[9] See Padgett, 443
[10] See Padgett, 443
[11] See Padgett, 443
[12] See Song, 440
[13] See pp. 216 in Janice Hopkins Tanne, “Bush vetoes bill to expand stem cell research”. BMJ, 2006. (www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/333/7561/216-b)
[14] See pp. 188 in Ted Peters and Gaymon Bennet Jr., “Stem Cell Research and the Claim of the Other in the Human Subject.” Dialog 43, (2004): 184-204
[15] See pp. 414 in Understanding Pathophysiology 3rd edition. (Mosby, 2004)
[16] See Peters and Bennet Jr., 188
[17] See Song, 442
[18] See Song, 442
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